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Abstract—Algorand is a recent, open-source public or permis-
sionless blockchain system that employs a novel proof-of-stake
byzantine consensus protocol to efficiently scale the distributed
transaction agreement problem to billions of users. In addition
to being more democratic and energy-efficient, compared to
popular protocols such as Bitcoin, Algorand also touts a much
high transaction throughput. Despite its promise, one relatively
under-studied aspect of this protocol has been the incentive
compatibility of its reward sharing approach, without which
cooperation cannot be guaranteed and the protocol will fail
in a practical environment comprising of rational users. This
paper is the first attempt in the literature to study and address
this problem. By carefully modeling the participation costs
and rewards received within a strategic interaction (or game)
scenario, we first empirically show (by means of simulations)
that even a small number of nodes defecting to participate in the
protocol tasks due to insufficiency of the available incentives can
result in the Algorand network failing to compute and add new
blocks of transactions. We further show that this effect, which
was observed in simulation experiments, can be formalized by
means of a mathematical (game-theoretic) model of interaction
in Algorand given its participation costs and the current (or
planned) reward distribution/sharing approach envisioned by
the Algorand Foundation. Specifically, on analyzing this game
model we observed that mutual cooperation under the currently
proposed reward sharing approach is not a Nash equilibrium.
This is a significant result which could threaten the success of an
otherwise robust distributed consensus mechanism. To remedy
this problem, we propose a novel reward sharing approach
for Algorand and formally show that it is incentive-compatible,
i.e., it can guarantee cooperation within a group of selfish
Algorand users. Extensive numerical and Algorand simulation
results further confirm our analytical findings. Moreover, these
results show that for a given distribution of stakes in the network,
our reward sharing approach can guarantee cooperation with a
significantly smaller reward per round. Our protocol also helps
designers to better react to different conditions in the network,
where the distribution of stakes can potentially converge to a
high population of nodes with small stakes.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Algorand, Incentive Compatibility,
Game Theory, Reward Sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is an immutable distributed database that
records a time-sequenced history of facts called transactions.
This record is maintained by constructing and maintaining
?M. Fooladgar and M. H. Manshaei are equally contributing authors.
consistent copies of the cryptographic hash-chain of transac-
tion blocks (or sets) in a distributed fashion. One key aspect
of any blockchain protocol is the consensus algorithm that
enables agreement among a distributed network of autonomous
nodes (a.k.a. miners in certain protocols) on the state of the
blockchain, under the assumption that a fraction of them
could be malicious or faulty. Blockchains could be further
categorized as permissioned or permissionless depending on
whether a trusted infrastructure exists or not to establish
verifiable identities for network nodes.
In Bitcoin [1], a popular permissionless blockchain protocol,
consensus is achieved by the network selecting a leader node
or block proposer in an unbiased fashion once every 10
minutes on an average (named as a round). The selected leader
node gets the right to commit or append a new block onto the
blockchain. The network then implicitly accepts this block by
adding the next block on top of it or reject it by choosing
some other block. Consensus in Bitcoin is thus long-term,
i.e., a block is said to be “included” in the blockchain if
it has received a significant number of confirmations1. The
Bitcoin protocol uses a proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism to
select the leader in each round, in which each node or miner
attempts to solve a hash puzzle and who solves it first is
selected and gets the right to propose the next block. As PoW
involves significant computation, the Bitcoin protocol includes
a reward mechanism to incentivize miners to compete in a fair
manner and to behave honestly. Besides Bitcoin, several other
distributed systems (e.g., Ethereum [2] and other alt-coins [3])
also employ a Bitcoin-like PoW-based consensus algorithm
and a reward model to ensure honest participation.
The wide-scale growth and adoption of Bitcoin, both in
terms of users and miners, exposed several significant and
inter-related issues with its PoW-based consensus mechanism.
In particular, the hash puzzle-based PoW approach is wasteful
in term of energy perspective [4], it does not prevent forking
in the blockchain, results in mining (and hash power) central-
ization [5]. More importantly, it does not scale well with the
number of transactions and network users [6]. For instance, the
1Number of blocks added on top of the block in question in the longest
valid blockchain.
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transaction rate of Bitcoin is currently only 7 transactions per
second, which is significantly lower than the transaction rates
afforded by centralized transaction processing systems such as
PayPal (450 transactions per second) and VisaNet (between
1667 and 56,000 transactions per second) [7]. It is clear that
current Bitcoin transaction throughput is not sufficient for
many practical applications. Several platform specific efforts,
such as BIP 102 [8] and Bitcoin-NG [9], have been proposed to
improve Bitcoins transaction throughput. Alternatively, other
platform-agnostic solutions aimed to improve the scalability-
related shortcomings of PoW-based consensus by employing
a committee or sharding approach [10], payment networks
[11], [12], and side-chains [13]. Other approaches have tried to
either improve the existing version of PoW itself [14] or have
proposed alternatives such as Proof-of-State (PoS) [15]–[19],
Proof-of-Burn (PoB) [20], Proof-of-Elapsed Time (PoET) [21]
and Proof-of-Personhood (PoP) [22]. Some other efforts [23],
[24] have attempted to improve scalability and throughput
by implementing the distributed block ledger as a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG), rather than a linear hash chain as done
by popular systems such as Bitcoin.
Of all the above efforts, the Algorand [19], [25] has garnered
the most attention within the permissionless blockchain and
cryptocurrency community, primarily because of its innovative
PoS-based consensus or byzantine agreement protocol that is
not only computationally (and energy) efficient, but also pro-
vides strong security guarantees against forking in a network
comprising of faulty and malicious users or nodes2. Algorand
eliminates the possibility of hash power centralization by
removing the difference between normal network users and
miners and scales pretty well. In fact, Algorand can commit
about 750 MBytes of transactions per hour, which is 125 times
of Bitcoin’s throughput [25]. These security and performance
guarantees of the Algorand consensus design have resulted in
a lot of optimism within the blockchain community. However,
one critical issue has not received much, if any, attention:
does the currently proposed Algorand reward distribution
approach promote participation or cooperation, and not de-
fection, among rational users to complete all the required
protocol tasks? In other words, is the current Algorand reward
distribution approach incentive-compatible?
Since the inception of Bitcoin, a significant effort has been
spent by the research community towards understanding the
incentive-compatibility of the Bitcoin’s reward distribution ap-
proach [26]–[28], towards characterizing the strategic behavior
of rational miners in mining pools [27], [29]–[33], and towards
designing new incentive-compatible PoW-based cryptocurren-
cies [4] and scalability solutions [34], [35]. Such a thorough
analysis under the additional assumption of rationality has
helped to significantly mature the permissionless blockchain
technology. However, no such analysis for the Algorand exists
yet, and this paper attempts to fill this research gap.
2The term users and nodes are used interchangeably. Typically, users control
nodes which are computational systems that are part of the Algorand peer-to-
peer network and execute the reference software.
Here, we make the first attempt to formally analyze the
Algorand’s reward distribution strategy by employing well-
established game-theoretic tools and techniques. More specif-
ically, by modeling a single round of the Algorand’s con-
sensus or byzantine agreement protocol as a single stage
non-cooperative multi-player game, we show that without an
efficient reward sharing protocol, nodes are willing to deviate
from cooperation and behave selfishly. Motivated by the need
for solving this deviation problem, we propose a new reward
distribution approach for Algorand, which is in addition to the
stake possessed by the users, the approach considers their role
in the byzantine agreement protocol in order to distribute the
per-round rewards. We further show that our proposed role-
based reward distribution approach is able to converge to a
Nash equilibrium (NE) where a certain subset of nodes will
cooperate. We design a reward sharing mechanism based on
our results and implement it in an Algorand simulator. We
conduct extensive empirical evaluation of the proposed reward
distribution approach using both a numerical and Algorand
protocol simulations. Our empirical evaluation further con-
firms our analytical results by showing that we can distribute
significantly smaller rewards among users and also enforce
cooperation in Algorand. The Algorand Foundation can use
our results to keep track of the network state and adapt reward
accordingly. They can also employ our analytical tool to adapt
the best reward distribution in the future, when they want to
distribute the transaction fees among Algorand users. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a
systematic analysis of incentive design in Algorand.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss
the state of the art of Algorand. In Section III, we present the
incentive design problem for Algorand. Section IV presents the
game model and its analysis. We also propose our novel reward
sharing approach in this section, following by our evaluations
in Section V. Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper.
II. ALGORAND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first summarize the Algorand protocol.
This description is intended to provide readers with the main
concepts of Algorand as it relates to this paper. Interested
readers are referred to [19] for more technical details on Algo-
rand and to [1] for Bitcoins and PoW-based blockchains. We
begin by first contrasting the consensus approaches employed
in PoW (e.g., Bitcoin) and PoS (e.g., Algorand) blockchains.
Then, we outline the network (communication) protocol of
Algorand followed by details of its consensus mechanism.
A. Contrasting Consensus in PoW with PoS Blockchains
Due to its open and distributed nature, consensus or agree-
ment (on transaction blocks) in current public blockchain
solutions such as Bitcoin have relied on a proof-of-work
(PoW) approach, where users must repeatedly compute hashes
to grow the blockchain, and the longest chain is considered
authoritative. However, there are several significant shortcom-
ings of such an approach:
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Fig. 1: Algorand System Model. (a) Algorand nodes build a peer-to-peer network which includes both malicious and honest
nodes. (b) In any given time slot, each user executes cryptographic sortition algorithm to determine his role in that time slot.
At time t1 each leader sends his proposed block to all first hop neighbors. Consequently, all nodes forward their received
blocks to their neighbors in the following time slots. (c) Reduction phase reduces consensus problem to agreement on one or
two options. Committee members select block with the highest priority among their received blocks and gossip their votes
for that. In step#1, committee members vote for highest priority block they received. In step#2, new committee members
count last step votes and re-transmit popular blocks as their vote in the second step. Output of this phase can be an empty
block in case of not-receiving minimum number of required votes. (d) BinaryBA? phase reach agreement on a proposed block
from reduction phase or an empty block. Note that the figure represents the case where the network has strong synchrony and
agrees on a final block. This is usually completed in the first step, i.e., k = 1. But this phase can be followed up (in average
for 11 steps, i.e., k = 11) to ensure that each node agrees on a same consensus. In each step committee members votes for
their observation of the reduction phase. (e) the final block would be added to the chain.
• PoW wastes significant amount of computation, and by
relation, the electrical energy used to achieve it. PoW
schemes also assume that a majority of the nodes con-
tributing to the network’s hash (or computational) power
are honest, i.e., at least 51% of the network’s hash power
comes from honest users/nodes.
• PoW-based consensus eventually leads to Concentra-
tion of Power, where entities in the network eventually
monopolize computational power to control new block
addition (e.g., Bitcoin Mining Pools) [30]–[32].
• PoW allows the possibility of forking where two different
hashchains could reach the same length and neither
one supersedes the other [27], [29]. Efforts to mitigate
the impact of forking in existing solutions has resulted
in the block inter-arrival and transaction confirmation
times to become impractically high (e.g., current Bitcoin
block inter-arrival time is 10 minutes while transaction
confirmation time is 1 hour). As a result, current PoW
blockchain solutions do not scale well with the number
of transactions and users.
To overcome these shortcomings, Algorand proposes a novel
proof-of-stake (PoS) based consensus protocol. Similar to Bit-
coin, Algorand is fully decentralized and maintains a public,
immutable ledger of transactions by reaching consensus on
the order of transactions in the ledger. However in Algorand
all users are “equal”, i.e, there is no distinction between users
(miners) who can add new blocks and those who just create
and receive transactions. Thus, Algorand is more democratic!
Moreover, as each user/node runs the same computationally
efficient functions to achieve consensus (as opposed to PoW-
based systems where users compete for the right to add the
next block), Algorand does not waste computations, and thus
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electricity. Lastly, the design of Algorand’s consensus protocol
guarantees that there is no forking with an overwhelmingly
high probability. A side-effect of this is that Algorand scales
extremely well with the number of users/nodes and transac-
tions, compared to classical PoW-based systems [25].
B. Summary of Algorand
Next, we summarize the creation, distribution and agree-
ment of transaction blocks in Algorand, as shown in Figure 1.
1) Assumed Adversary Model: In addition to standard cryp-
tographic assumptions, Algorand assumes that honest users
always run bug-free reference software and consequently fol-
low all defined steps by Algorand. As is standard in PoS
systems, Algorand assumes that the fraction of money held
by honest users is above some threshold h (a constant greater
than 23 ). An adversary can participate in Algorand by creating
multiple sybil nodes/users and owning some money or stake in
the system. An adversary in Algorand can arbitrarily corrupt
honest users, provided that the amount of money held by
honest, non-compromised users remain above the threshold h.
However an adversary cannot compromise the keys of honest
non-compromised users. Algorand assumes that most honest
users receive messages sent by most other honest users within
a known time bound in order to continue to make progress on
adding blocks to the blockchain (i.e., liveniness goal). This
is the strong synchrony assumption. Algorand can achieve
consensus or agreement on blocks (i.e., safety goal) even if
the network is asynchronous (or controlled by the adversary)
for a long but bounded period of time, provided it is strongly
synchronous for a long period of time after that.
2) Network and Communication Protocol: The Algorand
network is a peer-to-peer network of honest and faulty
or malicious nodes, where each node is represented by a
public/private key pair (see Figure 1-(a)). The number of
malicious or faulty nodes is bounded by the honest stake
ownership condition outlined earlier. Nodes in the network
communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion using unique TCP
connections. Communications happen by means of a standard
gossip protocol where each node broadcasts his message to all
his peers, who in turn relay it to their neighbors. The Algorand
communication protocol defines four types of messages:
• Transaction: this message transfers a certain amount of
Algos (currency unit in the Algorand system) from a
sender to a receiver (identified with their public-keys)
and signed by the sender (with its private key), which
is referred to as a transaction. Multiple transactions are
organized into a block. An Algorand block is either a set
of transactions or an empty block. In addition, each block
contains a pre-determined random seed (described later)
and the hash of the previous consensus or agreed block
it is extending.
• Voting: this message contains a signed vote by the sender
along with the sortition proof (described below). Each
sortition proof is associated with a priority value which
is computed in a deterministic fashion.
• Block proposal: this message contains a new Algorand
block (to be added), along with the signed hash of the
block and a sortition proof establishing the role of the
sender as a block proposer or leader.
• Credential: this message contains the sortition proof of
the block proposer or leader, which is generally broadcast
at the beginning of each round by the leader using the
gossip protocol. Peer nodes employ the priority values
extracted from sortition proofs in the credential messages
to avoid relaying block proposals with low priorities.
This helps preventing congestion in the network due to a
significantly large number of block proposals.
3) Consensus or Byzantine Agreement (BA?): Algorand’s
consensus or Byzantine Agreement (BA?) protocol operates
in rounds, where in each round all nodes attempt to reach
agreement on a new block of transactions. At the beginning of
a round, each node employs cryptographic sortition to privately
determine if it is a block proposer or leader, i.e., has the right
to propose a block for that round. To propose a block, each
leader node assembles the pending and validated transactions
inside a block proposal and gossips it together with its sortition
proof of being elected a leader (see Figure 1-(b)). After block
proposals are broadcast, each node collects incoming block
proposals for a fixed duration, selecting and retaining the one
valid block with the highest priority sortition proof.
Each user then (asynchronously) initializes the BA? proto-
col with the highest-priority block they have received. The
BA? protocol enables all nodes in the network to reach
consensus on a single block. The BA? protocol comprises
of two sequential phases, the Reduction phase (Figure 1-(c))
followed by the BinaryBA? phase (Figure 1-(d)), with each
phase consisting of a sequence of steps. At a high level, in each
step first a random or unpredictable group of nodes referred to
as committee members is elected. Then the elected committee
members vote on a specific block, based on votes received
from the previous step, and broadcast their new votes in voting
messages. Readers should recall that all voting messages also
contain a sortition proof which proves the validity of the
broadcaster as a committee member.
• Reduction Phase (Figure 1-(c)): This first phase of the
BA? protocol comprises of exactly two steps. In the first
step, each committee member votes for the hash of the
blocks proposed for consideration. In the second step,
committee members vote for the block hash that received
votes over a certain threshold. If no block hash receives
enough votes, committee members vote for the hash
of the default empty block. Reduction phase concludes
with either at most one non-empty block hash (the one
that received the maximum number of votes above the
threshold) or hash of an empty block (if no block hashes
received enough votes). This output of the reduction
phase is passed as input to the BinaryBA? phase.
• BinaryBA? Phase (Figure 1-(d)): The goal of the
BinaryBA? Phase is to reach agreement or consensus
on the majority voted non-empty block (hash) from the
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reduction phase or, in case there is no consensus, on the
empty (default) block. In the common case, when the
network is strongly synchronous and the block proposer
or leader was honest, BinaryBA? phase will start with the
same block hash for most users, and will reach consensus
in the first step, since most committee members vote
for the same block hash value. If the network is not
strongly synchronous, BinaryBA? may return consensus
on two different blocks (i.e., the block received from the
reduction phase and the empty block).
The outcome of the BinaryBA? phase is used by the BA? al-
gorithm to arrive at either a final or a tentative consensus. Final
consensus means that BA? will not reach consensus on any
other block for that round, while tentative consensus means
that BA? is unable to guarantee the safety goal in this round,
either because of network asynchrony or due to a malicious
block proposer or leader.
4) Cryptographic Sortition: Each node in the network
employs a cryptographic sortition algorithm to determine if it
is selected as a leader (or block proposer) at the beginning of
each round, and later, if it is selected as a committee member
at the beginning of each step (of both the Reduction and
BinaryBA? phases). The sortition algorithm is implemented
using Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) [36] which allow
users to produce verifiable proofs using their private keys
that can be publicly verified using the corresponding public
key. Specifically, in order to generate a sortition proof for
step s in round r, a user i computes sigi(r, s,Qr−1), where
sigi is a digital signature computed using the user i’s private
key, and Qr−1 is a random seed (predetermined at the end
of the previous round, i.e., r − 1). This sortition proof is
included by the nodes in their block proposals and voting
messages in order to prove their roles as leader and committee
members, respectively. The recipients of these messages first
validate the signature (using the public key) and then compute
the hash of the sortition proof to verify a certain sortition
condition that determines the validity of the claimed role. The
possibility that the condition is verified is directly proportional
to the stake of the node (to which the proof belongs to) and
depends on a constant role parameter fixed in the protocol.
Due to space restrictions, we will not further elaborate on
this verification condition and interested readers can find more
technical details in [19], [25], [36]. In summary, cryptographic
sortition is a simple, offline and lightweight process that
involves computing a single hash and a digital signature in
order to verify a node’s role, and thus, its eligibility to propose
a block and/or vote in the Algorand consensus (BA?) protocol.
III. INCENTIVE DESIGN IN ALGORAND: PROBLEM
FORMULATION AND MOTIVATIONS
Similar to any permissionless blockchain-based cryptocur-
rency protocol, Algorand must also provide enough incentives
to foster cooperation among its participants, whether they
are leaders, committee members, or online nodes, in order
to enable effective consensus (on the set of transactions). In
this section, we first summarize all processing costs defined
TABLE I: List of Symbols in Algorand Analysis
Symbol Definition
Ri Foundation reward in round ti
Fi Summation of transaction fees in round ti
PFi Reward pool level in round ti
Bi The shared rewards in round ti
α Fraction of rewards shared between leaders
β Fraction of rewards shared between committee members
γ Fraction of rewards shared between remaining online nodes
cfix Common costs of Algorand nodes
cL Costs for Algorand leaders
cM Costs for committee members
cK Costs for Algorand remaining online nodes
rLi Rewards per each unit of stake for a leader
rMi Rewards per each unit of stake for a committee member
rKi Rewards per unit of stake for a remaining online node
sj Stake of node j ∈ {lj ,mj , kj}; slj is reward for leader lj
SL Summation of all stakes for leaders; i.e. SL =
∑
j∈L slj
SM Summation of all stakes for committee members
SK Summation of all stakes for other nodes
SN Summation of all stakes, i.e., SN = SL + SM + SK
u
lj
i Payoff for leader lj in round ti
u
mj
i Payoff for committee member mj in round ti
u
kj
i Payoff for remanding node kj in round ti
in the Algorand Byzantine consensus protocol, followed by
a discussion of how rewards could be distributed among the
various protocol participants. Finally, we empirically show
that if rewards are not appropriately distributed in Algorand,
rational participants have an incentive to not cooperate (in
the consensus protocol tasks), resulting in no new blocks
being added. Our goal here is to highlight the need for
designing a incentive-compatible reward sharing mechanism
for achieving cooperation in Algorand. Note that Table I
presents the notations used throughout the paper.
A. Algorand Costs
Based on the summary of the Algorand operation outlined
in the previous section, it is clear that each participant or
user, irrespective of their role, is expected to perform some
processing and communication tasks during each phase of the
protocol which incurs some measurable cost, say, in terms of
consumed energy. These costs for each processing tasks can
be further quantified using monetary values (e.g., Dollars or
Algos) by using the current energy costs. Below we present
a brief description of each of these tasks that incur some
significant cost, which are also summarized in Table II. We
would like to stress that our goal here is not to precisely
quantify the cost associated with each task - we simply argue
that each of these tasks incurs a significant cost which can be
easily quantified and is abstracted by us as the corresponding
cost parameter.
Transaction Verification Cost (cve): This cost is incurred
by an Algorand node to check the validity of a transaction.
For each transaction validity check, the node must verify the
signature and also check whether the sending user has enough
Algos in its account for a successful transaction. A leader
assembles a set of transactions into a block, and all Algorand
nodes check the validity of transactions inside a block.
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TABLE II: Algorand tasks and costs given the role of nodes.
Task Symbol Leader Committee Others
lj mj kj
Transaction Verification cve X X X
Seed Generation cse X X X
Sortition Algorithm cso X X X
Verify Sortition Proof cvs X X X
Block Proposition cbl X
Gossiping cgo X X X
Block Selection cbs X
Vote cvo X
Vote Counting cvc X X X
Seed Generation Cost (cse): Algorand requires a random
and publicly known seed as an input to the sortition algorithm.
Thus, a new seed is published in each round of Algorand. This
seed is a random number generated by VRF [36] from the last
seed value and the current round number. Also, for security
concerns Algorand refreshes the seed every R rounds [25]. We
parameterize the cumulative cost of generating a new seed in
each round as cse.
Sortition Algorithm Cost (cso): As outlined in the previous
section, the sortition algorithm employs a VRF function [36]
to generate a membership proof which is included by leaders
and committee members in their messages to prove their role
(leader or committee member). The cost of processing all the
tasks of the sortition algorithm is parameterized as cso.
Block proposition Cost (cbl): The cost of assembling a set
of outstanding, but valid, transactions (including the sortition
proof) into a block and broadcasting it to the neighboring
nodes in the network is borne by each (selected) leader node
in each round. We parameterize this cost as cbl.
Gossiping Cost (cgo): During each round, each node in
the Algorand network supports the network by forwarding
(gossiping) network messages, including transactions, blocks
and votes. A cumulative expected cost for each round for each
node is parameterized by us as cgo.
Block Selection Cost (cbs): In each round of the Algorand
protocol, the sortition algorithm will select multiple (up to 70)
nodes as leaders, with each leader proposing its own block.
Each committee member in each round, specifically, during
the reduction phase of the BinaryBA? protocol, need to select
(and vote) for the block with the highest priority. This block
selection cost borne by a subset of committee members in each
round, which includes the verification of sortition proofs, is
parameterized as cbs
Vote Cost (cvo): Each selected committee member during
each step of the BinaryBA? protocol should validate and check
incoming messages (including, votes from previous steps)
before submitting its own vote in that step. This cost, which
also includes cost to append the sortition proof to the outgoing
vote and broadcast to neighbors, is parameterized by us as
cvo. The timeout to submit a vote is defined by Algorand and
is equal to 20 seconds. It should be noted that cvo does not
include the cost of vote counting and is outlined next.
Vote Counting Cost (cvc): After all committee members
have submitted their votes, each Algorand node should vali-
date voting messages by checking their sortition proofs. cvc
represents all associated costs of sortition proofs and signature
verifications incurred when counting and tallying the votes
inside each received vote message.
Given the above parameterization of some significant indi-
vidual costs, let us outline the overall costs incurred by each
individual Algorand node. Each node incurs a cumulation of
two types of costs: (i) a fixed cost, and (ii) a role-based cost.
The fixed cost (cfix) represents the required costs borne by
each node irrespective of its role and is given as:
cfix = cve + cse + cso + cgo + cvs + cvc. (1)
In addition to the fixed cost cfix in each round, each node
incurs a cost based on its role(s) (i.e., Leader, Committee
Member or None) in that round and is represented as follows:
cj =

cfix + cbl j ∈ L
cfix + cbs + cvo j ∈M
cfix j ∈ K,
(2)
where L,M, and K are the sets of leaders, committee members
and all other users without particular rule, in round i.
B. Reward Sharing in Algorand
Given the various costs, as outlined above, it is clear that
rational users or participants (which we assume our users
are) will fully participate in the distributed consensus protocol
of Algorand if and only if they have enough incentive (or
rewards) to do it. As Algorand is a cryptocurrency, the
mechanism for providing incentives is straightforward - pay
users in Algos for their participation efforts and costs. Bitcoin
(and other cryptocurrencies) has an incentive model where the
winner of the PoW puzzle receives incentives in the form of
block rewards and transaction fees (paid out in Bitcoins) to be
engaged in the PoW and block addition process. A similarly
question arises in Algorand: which users should be paid, and
how much, in order to enable their continued participation in
the distributed consensus process?
Recently, the Algorand Foundation3 has suggested a tenta-
tive version of reward sharing in their protocol [37], [38], as
shown in Figure 2. The proposed reward sharing mechanism
assumes creation and maintenance of two reward pools: (i)
Foundation Reward Pool, and (ii) Transaction Reward Pool.
These pools are nothing but public keys controlled by the
Foundation. These public keys act as a central (foundation-
controlled) storage where reward distribution related funds
(Algos) are deposited. All rewards for each round of the
Algorand protocol are expected to be disbursed (or transferred)
from this public key. To bootstrap the new cryptocurrency, the
Algorand foundation implemented a ceiling of 1.75 billion
Algos to be disbursed from the Foundation Reward Pool. Per
the foundation, in each round Ri Algos are added to the
Foundation Reward Pool until the ceiling of 1.75 billion is
reached. According to Algorand Foundation, the projected
3The Algorand Foundation is dedicated to fulfilling the global promise of
blockchain technology by leveraging the Algorand protocol and open source.
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Bi  Ri) Algos are actually disbursed among the participating
or system users. Note that we currently do not know the precise
value of Ri, and it is left to the system designers. Moreover,
initially Bi is expected to be equal to Ri.
Let us assume that the total value of stake in the system is
SN . Thus,
SN = SL + SM + SK .
Here, SL, SM , and SK are the total stake values of leaders,
committee members, and all other online nodes in round i,
respectively. Then, the rewards assigned to a leader node lj in
round i, Rji , would be
Bislj
SN
, where slj is the stake of leader
lj . In summary, we can define all reward distributions by:
Rji =
8><>:
rLi slj j 2 L
rMi smj j 2M
rKi skj j 2 K
(2)
where rLi = r
M
i = r
K
i = ri =
Bi
SN
. Considering the proposed
approach for reward sharing by Algorand Foundation, we are
going to analyze whether the proposed mechanism can provide
enough incentive for nodes’ cooperation in the following
sections.
C. To be Cooperative or Not: Problem Motivation
Let us assume that a node in Algorand network is cooper-
ative, when it plays its role appropriately by performing all
of the assigned tasks and consequently accepts the associated
costs. On the other hand, a defective node is only online but
does not perform its assign tasks. Note that in this case, if
we do not deploy any punishment mechanism, the node will
still obtain its reward based on the proposed model of reward
sharing by Algorand Foundation.
In order to get an insight about the effectiveness of the
proposed approach for Algorand reward sharing, we first
conducted a set of simulations to see if the proposed model
is robust enough against any selfish behavior of nodes. In
summary, we would like to observe the effect of defective
nodes who get rewards and do not contribute to the Algorand
network. We constructed our simulator based on Deka et al.
Algorand discrete event simulator [38]. This simulator has
been written in python and simulates all modules in Algorand
protocol, including sortition, reduction, BinaryBA? , network
delays, etc. We can also customize different network param-
eters, e.g., number of nodes, distribution of network message
delay, etc. We also developed the Algorand foundation reward
sharing protocol in this simulator to compute rewards and
share them among the Algorand nodes in each round.
In each round of our simulation, Algorand nodes run sim-
ulated sortition algorithm to obtain their role in that round.
Then, leaders propose the blocks for their received transac-
tions and gossip the proposed blocks through the network.
Committee members start voting for the received blocks in
Reduction and BinaryBA? phases, in order to reach consensus
on a single final block. Finally, all nodes will count votes for
the last step of BinaryBA? and compute the agreed block.
Before the next round, the reward sharing algorithm would
be started and it computes and sends rewards to all nodes,
according to the proposed Algorand Foundation mechanism.
Note that the following results have been obtained by running
100 simulations and make an average over all possible block
outcomes. In each simulation instance, we randomly select
defective notes by a uniform distribution, where we assume
that the defective nodes could be 5%, 10%, or 15% of all
nodes in the network. Moreover, we distribute stakes among
all nodes with a uniform distribution between 1 to 50 Algos.
We first analyze the impact of defective nodes on the
block creation process.The corresponding number of nodes
who extracted final, tentative, or no blocks from the network
messages (i.e., votes) are plotted in Figure 3. As shown in
Figure 3-(a), low defection rates has no significant impact on
the consensus process and most of the Algorand nodes reach
consensus on a single final block. But, as the defection rate
increases, the number of tentative blocks and number of nodes
who could not extract any block increases.
For example, as shown in Figure 3-(c), with 15% defection
rate, most of Algorand nodes don’t reach any consensus on a
final block. Moreover, the number of nodes who cannot follow
the ledger starts increasing exponentially somewhere around
round #40. In other words, with 15% of defective nodes the
network may go to weak synchrony state or even asynchrony
in some rounds and it prevents some nodes to receive network
messages (e.g. votes, block proposals, and etc). However, by
reaching the strong synchronous network after a long period
of asynchrony (i.e. weak synchrony assumption), nodes who
have extracted tentative blocks can finalize their blocks. This
effect has been highlighted in Figure 3-(c) around round 10 to
17. As it is shown, in round #12 the asynchrony of network
have caused increasing in the number of nodes who have
extracted tentative blocks from the network. But in round#13,
network becomes synchronous again and consequently most of
Algorand nodes extract finalized blocks.
We also need to clarify that these defective nodes may con-
trol more than threshold h (i.e. Algorand honest assumption
as defined in Section II-B1), if there exist many rich nodes in
the defection list. In this case, defection of these rich nodes
can make more serious problem on the network synchrony and
consequently the block creation process.
Hence, the above simulation results show that without any
incentive-compatible mechanism, the Algorand protocol fails
to perform consensus agreement and produce blocks. In fact,
if we cannot provide enough incentives to nodes to cooperate
the network can easily go to asynchrony mode and fail to
provide blocks. In the following section, we will propose a
game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of defection and
propose possible solution to avoid defective behavior in these
networks.
IV. GAME MODEL AND INCENTIVE ANALYSIS IN
ALGORAND
In order to obtain a good insight of the strategic behavior
of the nodes in Algorand, we model the interaction of these
vii
Fig. 2: Algorand first sha es the reward from 1.75B Algos.
Each time it shares Ri among all users. We assume that the
amount of reward taking out of the pool in round i is equal to
the input reward, i.e., Bi = Ri. Algorand saves all transaction
fees in another pool to be used later.
rewards for the first 12 reward periods follows the values
presented in Table III [37] [38]. Each reward period pans
500 thousands blocks. For example, in the first reward period,
10 millions Algos would be distributed, which is equal to
approximately 20 Algos for each round, if in each round a
block could be successfully added to the ledger.
The reward sharing proposal suggests that in each round this
reward Ri is distributed among Algorand users in proportion
to their current system stake, irrespective of their roles (i.e.,
leaders or committee member). In other words, users with
higher stake receive a larger portion of the allocated foundati n
reward Ri in each round. The transaction fees accumulated
from the transactions in the added blocks during the bootstrap
phase are saved or deposited into the Transaction Fee Pool.
This pool is not planned to be used for reward disbursement
until the 1.75 billion Algo ceiling of the Foundation Reward
pool is met. In summary, currently only the Foundation
Reward Pool is being used for the per-round reward (or
incentive disbursement). Out of the Ri Algos disbursed o the
Foundation Reward Pool per round i, let us assume that Bi
(where, Bi ≤ Ri) Algos are actually disbursed among the
participating or system users. Initially Bi is expected to be
equal to Ri. Let us assume that the total value of stake in
the system is SN . Thus, SN = SL + SM + SK . Here, SL,
SM , and SK are the total stake values of leaders, committee
members, and all other online nodes in round i, respectively.
These values are changing in each round, but for the sake of
presentation we write SN instead of SN (i). Then, the rewards
assigned to a leader node lj in round i, R
j
i , would be
Bislj
SN
,
where slj is the stake of leader lj . In summary, we can define
all reward distributions by:
Rji =

rLi slj j ∈ L
rMi smj j ∈M
rKi skj j ∈ K,
(3)
where rLi = r
M
i = r
K
i = ri =
Bi
SN
. Considering the proposed
approach for rew rd haring by the Algorand Foundation, we
now analyze if the incentives pr vided by this mechanism is
enough to guarantee cooperation by rational nodes.
C. To be Cooperativ or Not: Pr blem Motivation
Let us assume that an Algorand node is cooperative when
it plays its role honestly by performing all of the assigned
tasks, and consequently accepting all the associated costs. In
contrast, a defective node only remains online but does not
perform any of its assigned tasks, except sortition computing
to join t e network (i.e., paying c st cso). In this case, if ap-
propriate cou termeasures (e.g., punishment mechanisms) are
not deployed, the d fecting nodes may end up earning ewar s
by simply relying on other nodes to honestly perform their
tasks and not contributing anything towards the block proposal,
verification and consensus tasks. Considering this definition
for cooperative and defective behavior, we can divide Algorand
node behaviors into the following four categories:
• Ho est nodes: These nodes alwa s cooperate. They are
also altruistic and cooperate even when the ward is n t
more than the cost of cooperation.
• Honest but Selfish nodes: These nodes cooperate and
defect depending on the amount of received incentives
versus the cost for their actions. In other words, they are
always selfish and will cooperate if and only if the reward
is more than the cost of cooperation.
• Malicious nodes: They arbitrarily cooperate or defect. In
addition to this, they may inject mali ious transactions
and bl cks, or arbitrarily compromise other nodes.
• Faulty nodes: These nodes are offline due to system
malfunction (and not by choice) and do not contribute
anything to the network operation.
In this paper, we assume that all network nodes behave
in an honest but selfish manner. Moreover, in this prelimi-
nary work, we assume that nodes do not arbitrarily behave
m liciously or become faulty. I other words, nodes in our
network make a strat gic decision to cooperat (participate)
or defect (not participate) solely by maximizing their own
interests/incentives. They neither make any arbitrary protocol
participation decision, nor maliciously modify the protocol to
maximize their interests/incentives. To get an insight into the
robustness of the proposed Algorand reward sharing approach
against selfish (or rational) node/user behavior, we conduct
some preliminary simulation experiments.
Our simulator, written in Python, is based on the Algorand
discrete event simulator by Deka et al. [39] and implements
all Algorand protocol modules, including, Sortition, Reduction
and BinaryBA?. We are also able to simulate network delays
and various synchrony conditions, as well as, customize dif-
ferent network parameters such as total number of nodes and
the distribution of network message delays in our simulator.
Within this simulation framework, we also implemented the
reward sharing protocol proposed by the Algorand Foundation
(described earlier), which computes a per-round reward to
be shared among the nodes. We simulate each round of the
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TABLE III: Algorand Foundation suggested reward distribution in the first 12 reward period (equal to 6 millions blocks).
Reward Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Projected Reward (Millions of Algos) 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 36 38 38
Algorand block proposal and consensus protocol, as outlined
in Section II , and execute the reward sharing algorithm at the
end of each round to compute and distribute rewards to all the
network nodes based on the reward sharing protocol.
We simulate 100 runs of the protocol rounds, and average
over all the possible block outcomes in 100 simulations. In
each simulation instance, we randomly select defective nodes
(i.e., honest and selfish nodes who chose to defect given their
payoff) by means of a uniform distribution. We consider the
total number of defective nodes in the network in steps of 5%,
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, and 30% of all the nodes in Algorand
network. Moreover, we distribute the stakes among all nodes
with a uniform distribution between 1 to 50 Algos. Note that
we compute trimmed mean which ignores 20% top and bottom
data to compute the mean values of these 100 simulations.
In our simulation each node sends the messages to 5 other
nodes that are randomly selected from the network. We first
analyze the impact of defective nodes on the block creation
process.The corresponding number of nodes who extracted
final, tentative, or no blocks from the network messages (i.e.,
votes) are plotted in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3-(a), even
with a low defection rate of 5% the number of tentative blocks
is increasing in the network. Moreover, about 7% of nodes do
not receive any block. When the number of defective nodes is
increasing the Algorand network fails to inform most of nodes
about the final blocks.
For example, as shown in Figure 3-(c), with 15% defection
rate, most of Algorand nodes don’t reach any consensus on
a final block after round #30. In other words, with 15% of
defective nodes the network may go to weak synchrony state
or even asynchrony in some rounds and it prevents some nodes
to receive network messages (e.g., votes and block proposals).
However, by reaching the strong synchronous network after a
long period of asynchrony (i.e. weak synchrony assumption),
nodes who have extracted tentative blocks can finalize their
blocks. This effect has been highlighted in Figure 3-(c) in
the proximity of rounds 17 through 20. As shown in the
figure, in round #17 the asynchrony of network has caused an
increase in the number of nodes that have extracted tentative
blocks from the network. But in round #18, network becomes
synchronous again and consequently a majority of the Algo-
rand nodes are able to extract the finalized blocks. We also
need to clarify that these defective nodes may control more
than threshold h (i.e. Algorand honest assumption as defined
in Section II-B1) of stakes in the network. This happens if
there are more nodes with high values of stakes in the list
of defective nodes. Defection of these nodes can amplify
the network synchrony problem in the Algorand network and
consequently the block creation process. Finally, the results
show that with even 30% of defective nodes the network fails
even in the first few rounds.
In summary, the above simulation results show that without
an incentive-compatible reward sharing approach that fosters
cooperation, rational nodes will be inclined to defect from the
block creation and consensus process resulting in asynchrony
mode and fail to provide blocks. In the following section, we
will propose a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of
defection and propose a possible solution to avoid defective
behavior in the Algorand network.
IV. GAME MODEL AND INCENTIVE ANALYSIS IN
ALGORAND
In order to obtain a good insight of the strategic behavior
of the nodes in Algorand, we model the interaction of these
nodes with a static non-cooperative game. We first focus on
the interaction between the Algorand nodes who are supposed
to interact and create blocks in each round. Let us assume
that these nodes are the players of a static game GAl in round
i of the Algorand process. We assume that all strategies are
hard-wired for each node. In other words, each node does not
change his chosen strategy during round i of the game. They
also choose their strategies simultaneously.
In our Algorand game GAl users must decide whether to
cooperate and contribute to make a new block or not. The
game GAl is defined as a triplet (P,S,U), where P is the set
of players, S is the set of strategies and U is the set of payoff
values. The set of players P includes leaders L, committee
members M, and all other users K, i.e., P = L
⋃
M
⋃
K.
An Algorand node can take an action (si) from the set
S = {C,D,O}, where C, D, and O represent (i) Cooperate,
(ii) Defect, and (iii) Offline, respectively. As we discussed in
previous section, cooperative nodes follow all defined tasks,
while defective nodes are only online but do not perform their
assign tasks. Moreover, a node can play offline in round i
(i.e., plays O), in which it runs sortition computing but it
becomes offline and do not receive any reward. Given the
above assumption, the following lemma shows that the O
strategy is always strictly dominated by D strategy.
Lemma 1. In GAl, strategy O is strictly dominated by playing
defection (D).
Proof. A user always obtains greater payoffs by playing D
instead of O, for all possible strategy profiles of other users
(i.e., opponents). In fact, a user can obtain the reward by
playing D in the current version of Algorand, but it’s payoff
would be −cso, if it plays O.
Given the result in Lemma 1, we are not going to consider
strategy O in our analysis as it cannot appear in any Nash
equilibrium or will not be chosen by any rational player. In
the following section, we present our results for the analysis
of GAl. Recall that the definition of GAl are based on the
proposed reward sharing by Algorand Foundation [37].
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(a) Defection Rate: 5% (b) Defection Rate: 10% (c) Defection Rate: 15%
(d) Defection Rate: 20% (e) Defection Rate: 25% (f) Defection Rate: 30%
Fig. 3: The percentage of nodes who extracted the tentative and final blocks with different rate of defection. In each scenario,
we randomly choose nodes to behave as honest but selfish nodes. These nodes are called defective and will not cooperate if
the benefit is not more than the cost of cooperation for them.
A. Analysis of GAl
In GAl, we define strategies profiles All−D and All−C,
where all nodes choose to play C and Play D, respectively. We
apply the following game-theoretic concept to analyze GAl.
Definition 1. The strategy profile s∗ constitutes a Nash equi-
librium profile if none of the players can unilaterally change
his strategy to increase his utility.
In other words, if all strategies are mutual best responses to
each other, then no player has any motivation to deviate from
the given strategy profile. The following theorem shows the
existence of all defection strategy (All −D) NE for GAl.
Theorem 1. In each round i of GAl with N players (nL
leaders, nM committee members, and nK remaining nodes),
all-defection strategy profile (All−D) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us consider a strategy profile where all Algorand
nodes defect, where there is no incurred costs such as cL, cM ,
or cK for a leader, committee member, or other online nodes.
Hence, the payoff for each node would be ui = −cso as there
is no block added to the chain and they cannot earn any Algo.
In this case:
1) None of the Algorand leaders lj can increase their payoff
unilaterally by changing their strategies. Because, the
cooperative leader can not gain any reward without
contribution of at least SSTEP committee members in
each step of BA? protocol and SFINAL members for
the final committee, as discussed in Section II. In other
words, the payoff of a leader who deviates from D to C
would be ulji (C) = −cL, which is always smaller than
his defective payoff (i.e., ulji (D) = −cso).
2) Similarly, a cooperative committee member mj cannot
obtain any reward without the contribution of leaders
and sufficient number of committee members. In this
case, payoff of a committee member who has deviated
is umji = −cM .
3) With similar justification, we can prove that all other
online nodes kj will not be able to increase their payoffs
unilaterally by deviating from D to C, as its payoff
would be decreased to ukji (C) = −cK .
Hence, All −D strategy profile is a NE in GAl.
In fact, in such distributed protocols one would like to
enforce All−C strategy profiles as a Nash equilibrium. But the
following theorem shows that the current Algorand incentive
mechanism can not enforce all nodes to cooperate.
Theorem 2. In each round i of GAl with N players (nL > 1
leaders, nM committee members, and nK remaining nodes),
if rewards are shared solely based on the current values of the
stakes as shown in Equation (3), i.e., the proposed Algorand
Foundation mechanism, we cannot establish all-cooperation
strategy profile (All-C) as a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
Proof. First, let us assume that all Algorand nodes have
already cooperated and paid the costs cL, cM , or cK as leader,
committee member, or other online nodes. Given the values of
costs and rewards calculated in Equation (2) and (3), one can
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compute the payoff for each node j ∈ {lj ,mj , kj} in round i
as follows:
uji (C) =

rislj − cL Leader lj
rismj − cM Committee member mj
riskj − cK Online node kj
(4)
Consequently, by comparing cooperative and defective payoffs
for each node, and if we assume that they deviate unilaterally,
we can conclude that
1) A leader lj can increase his payoff unilaterally by
ignoring his role and acting as an online node without
any role. In other words, it plays D and acts as an
online node. Because, other leaders are still active in the
Algorand network and the protocol can reach consensus
with remaining nodes. So, lj will pay the cost cso which
is always smaller than cL.
2) Similarly, a committee member mj can increase his
payoff unilaterally by ignoring his role and play D.
3) Finally, a remaining member kj can increase his payoff
by avoiding to pay cK costs and just keep himself online
without gossiping messages (i.e., play D). Recall that it
must still pay cso for sortition computing. In this case,
the utility of node kj would be u
kj
i (D) = riskj − cso
which is greater than his previous payoff.
Then, All−C strategy profile can never be an NE in GAl.
The results presented by Theorems 1 and 2 show that we
are cannot enforce cooperation in the current version of reward
sharing in Algorand. In fact, if all users are rational they will
try to only play D and the system remains in All −D Nash
equilibrium. The main problem is due to have different costs
for different type of nodes, whereas they receive the same
portion of rewards. Hence, in the following we suggest a novel
mechanism to share rewards in Algorand which considers
different type of users.
B. Our Proposed Reward Sharing Mechanism
As shown in Figure 4, we suggest that the reward Bi
must be divided into three portions, and then be distributed
among the nodes given their stakes. In our model, we assume
that αBi, βBi, and γBi must be distributed among leaders,
committee members, and other online nodes, where α ∈ (0, 1),
β ∈ (0, 1), and γ ∈ (0, 1) should be chosen by the designer,
such that Algorand Foundation can enforce the cooperation
among users. Note that α + β + γ = 1. Given this approach,
one can provide different incentives to different type of users.
Hence, the payoff would be calculated by
uji (C) =

rLi slj − cL Leader lj
rMi smj − cM Committee member mj
rKi skj − cK Online node kj ,
(5)
where rLi =
αBi
SL
, rMi =
βBi
SM
, and rKi =
γBi
SK
. Let us now
define and analyze a new game GAl+, in which the payoffs
are calculated by Equation (5).
L
Leaders
M
Committee 
members
K
Other Nodes
αBi  
βBi  
(1-α-β)Bi  
  
Bi
Fig. 4: Our proposed model shares the reward according to
the roles of nodes as well as their stakes.
C. Analysis of GAl+
In this section, we will first find conditions under which we
can foster cooperation of users. Then we will investigate the
existence of NE in this game. The following lemma presents
the conditions under which, the leaders and the committee
members have enough incentive to cooperate in round i.
Lemma 2. Considering GAl+ with N players (nL > 1 leaders,
nM committee members, and nK remaining nodes), where
reward Bi shares with ratios α, β, and γ = 1−α−β between
leaders, committee members, and remaining nodes. A selfish
leader lj or committee member mj cannot deviate from C
strategy unilaterally to increase its payoff, if and only if:
Bi > max{ c
L − cso
( αSL −
γ
SK+s∗lj
)s∗lj
,
cM − cso
( βSM −
γ
SK+s∗mj
)s∗mj
},
where s∗lj and s
∗
mj are the minimum values of stakes for the
leaders and committee members in round i.
Proof. Let us consider that all leaders and committee members
have cooperated in a given strategy profile. In this case, the
payoff for any cooperative leader lj ∈ L would be equal
to ulji (C) =
αBi
SL
slj − cL. This payoff would be changed
to ulji (D) =
γBi
SK+slj
slj − cso, if the leader lj plays D and
only keep its status online, without playing its role of a leader
in Algorand. Hence, this leader has no incentive to defect if
u
lj
i (C) > u
lj
i (D). Consequently, we can show that under the
following condition on Bi, the leader lj has no incentive to
deviate from C to D:
Bi >
cL − cso
( αSL −
γ
SK+slj
)slj
. (6)
Similarly, any committee member mj ∈ M cannot increase
his payoff unilaterally by defecting and play D if:
Bi >
cM − cso
( βSM −
γ
SK+smj
)smj
. (7)
Given two different bounds on the distributed rewards in
Equations (6) and (7), and if we consider that s∗lj and s
∗
lm
are the minimum values of stakes for leaders and committee
members in round i, we can conclude that no leader or
committee member can deviate in round i if
Bi > max{ c
L − cso
( αSL −
γ
SK+s∗lj
)s∗lj
,
cM − cso
( βSM −
γ
SK+s∗mj
)s∗mj
}.
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The results presented in Lemma 2 show that the Algorand
Foundation must always distribute enough rewards to the
leader and the committee members in each round to enforce
cooperative behaviors among them. The optimal reward Bi is
a function of the cost of cooperation and the current state
of stakes in this round. It also depends on the values of
α, β, and γ, which must be selected by the administrator.
We consider that these values would be announced at the
beginning of each round. Another interesting fact is that if
we assign more fraction of the reward Bi to the leaders
and the committee members (i.e., increasing the values of α
and β), we can reduce the value of reward Bi, but have all
leaders and committee members cooperative in a cooperative
strategy profile. This will help the administrator to save more
Algos for future use. Finally, giving more rewards to online
nodes (kj ∈ K) will increase the value of required reward
for cooperative behavior of leaders and committee members.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in Lemma 2, the following
conditions must hold:
α
SL
− γ
SK + slj
> 0 (8)
β
SM
− γ
SK + smj
> 0 (9)
This can be easily proved given that the cost of cooperation
for the leaders and the committee members (i.e., cL and cM )
are always positive. Having the required conditions on coop-
erative behavior of the leaders and the committee members
in our hand with Lemma 2, we can now establish required
conditions under which GAl+ has a Nash equilibrium apart
from All−D Nash equilibrium, in which some users cooperate
in Algorand network. In fact this new class of cooperative NE
in GAl+, will depend on the behavior of other online nodes
and their characteristics in the Algorand network for any given
round. Let us first review two important concepts defined by
Algorand [25] in the following definitions.
Definition 2. In Algorand network, “strong synchrony” is a
network state, where most honest Algorand nodes (e.g., 95%)
can send messages that would be received by most of the other
nodes (e.g., 95%) within a given time limit.
Definition 3. In Algorand network, with “weak synchrony”
state, the network can be asynchronous for a long but bounded
period of time. After this asynchrony period, network must be
again strongly synchronous for a reasonably long time.
By having strong and weak synchrony definitions, we can
form multiple sets of Algorand nodes which meet strongly
synchronous network assumption together.
Definition 4. “Algorand strong synchrony set” is a list of
Algorand nodes that together forms a strongly synchronous
network.
As Algorand protocol achieves liveness in strongly syn-
chronous settings and safety with weak synchrony, the fol-
lowing theorem focuses on finding Nash equilibria for GAl+
with the strong synchrony assumption.
Theorem 3. In game GAl+ with N players (nL > 1 leaders,
nM committee members, and nK remaining nodes), for each
Algorand strong synchrony set Y, a strategy profile s∗ is a
Nash equilibrium in round i, if in this strategy profile:
1) All leaders cooperate,
2) All committee members cooperate,
3) All other nodes which are in Y cooperate, and
4) Other online nodes defect
and the value of Bi is selected such that,
Bi > max{ c
L − cso
( αSL −
γ
SK+s∗lj
)s∗lj
,
cM − cso
( βSM −
γ
SK+s∗mj
)s∗mj
,
(cK − cso)SK
s∗kjγ
}
where s∗lj , s
∗
mj , and s
∗
kj
are the minimum values of stakes for
leaders, committee members, and other online nodes in Y, in
round i.
Proof. Let us assume that strategy profile s∗ is already played.
We must now prove that none of the users can increase their
payoffs unilaterally. The payoff of leaders and committee
members cannot be increased unilaterally if the conditions of
Lemma 2 are hold. For each remaining node skj which is
the member of Algorand strong synchrony set Y, the payoff
of cooperation would be ukji (C) =
γBi
SK
skj − cK . But, the
payoff of a defective node would be ukji (D) = −cso. In other
words, if a member of Y defects, no new final block would
be created in this round given Definition 2. So, to prevent skj
from defecting:
u
kj
i (C) > u
kj
i (D)
=⇒ γBi
SK
skj − cK > −cso
=⇒ Bi > (c
K − cso)SK
skjγ
(10)
Hence this would be added to the conditions of Lemma 2
to form the Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the game.
Finally, other online nodes who are not in Algorand strong
synchrony set can not increase their payoffs by deviating from
D to C and accept the incurred cost of cK , as the block would
be made whether they cooperate or not.
D. Proposed Reward Sharing Mechanism
Our next goal is to extend the current Algorand reward shar-
ing method by considering strategic behavior of users/nodes.
In this case, we provide a solution for Algorand Foundation
to foster cooperative behavior among all Algorand nodes, by
sharing rewards based on the assigned roles. Moreover, our
computed bounds in Theorem 3 shows that we can minimize
the reward Bi by selecting suitable values for α, β, and γ.
Our results presented in Section III-C showed that the
Algorand Foundation needs to deploy an incentive-compatible
mechanism to prevent nodes from selfish behavior and defect
to increase its payoff unilaterally. We have proposed an algo-
rithm based on Theorem 3 which provides enough incentive
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Algorithm 1 Incentive-Compatible Reward Sharing
1: procedure COMPUTEPARAMETERS(L, M , K, Stakes)
2: // Compute Stakes & Costs
3: SL ←
∑
l∈L sl
4: SM ←
∑
m∈M sm
5: SK ←
∑
k∈K sk
6: cL, cM , cK ← ALGORANDCOSTS( )
7: // Compute minimum slj and smj
8: s∗lj ← minlj∈L slj
9: s∗mj ← minmj∈M smj
10: s∗kj ← minkj∈K skj
11: // Compute α, β, Bi from Theorem 3 bounds
12: Find α, β to minimize Bi where:
13:
Bi > max{ c
L − cso
( α
SL
− γ
SK+s
∗
lj
)s∗lj
,
cM − cso
( β
SM
− γ
SK+s
∗
mj
)s∗mj
,
(cK − cso)SK
s∗kjγ
}
return α, β, Bi
14: end procedure
for Algorand nodes to cooperate. Our proposed Algorithm 1
proceeds as follows: at the end of each Algorand round, the
Algorand Foundation computes the stakes for the leaders, the
committee members, and other online nodes as SL, SM , and
SK . It also computes the minimum stakes for each role as s∗lj ,
s∗mj , and s
∗
kj
. Finally, foundation will calculate the optimal
values for α and β to minimize Bi, by using the defined
bounds in Theorem 3. As these values will be computed at
the end of each round, all Algorand nodes know in advance
that they cannot deviate from cooperation to obtain better
payoff. Hence, the mechanism is strategy-proofed and there
is no incentive for nodes to defect.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our proposed mechanism, we first
conduct a series of numerical analysis to obtain the best
reward shares in our model (i.e., α and β). We then deploy
our proposed reward sharing mechanism over Algorand and
evaluate its performance, comparing to the reward sharing
proposed by Algorand Foundation.
A. Optimal Reward Share Calculation: A Numerical Analysis
According to the results presented in Theorem 3, we can
minimize the reward in each round such that it guarantees the
cooperation of subset of Algorand nodes. The optimal reward
is ensured by choosing optimal reward shares for leaders and
committee members, i.e., α and β. In our numerical analysis,
we assume that the minimum acceptable values of stakes for
each role are equal to s∗l = 1, s
∗
m = 1, and s
∗
k = 10 Algos.
In other words, by setting s∗k = 10, we ignore any strong
synchrony set containing nodes with stakes less than 10 Algos
in our simulations. We also assume that the cost of cooperation
for the leaders, the committee members, and other nodes are
cL = 16, cM = 12, cK = 6, and cso = 5 micro Algos. Figure 5
shows the results for the minimum values of Bi in each round,
Fig. 5: Minimum values of Bi for different α and β values.
for different values of α and β. Our results show that for
(α, β) = (0.02, 0.03), the minimum values of Bi would be
about 5.2 Algos per round.
In fact, considering the value of SK which is always much
greater than SL and SM , the calculated bounds presented
in Theorem 3 is usually a function of third bound, i.e.,
(cK−cso)SK
s∗kj γ
. Hence, to minimize the value of Bi we need to
maximize gamma and consequently minimize α and β (recall
that γ = 1− α− β). In summary, we should always consider
enough share of the total reward for leaders and committee
members, as shown in Equations (8) and (9). Moreover,
we also provide enough rewards to all other online nodes
considering the value Bi which is greater than
(cK−cso)SK
s∗kj γ
.
B. Performance Evaluation of Our Proposed Mechanism
Given the calculated values for α and β, we evaluate the
performance of our proposed mechanism in term of reward
sharing and fostering cooperation. We simulate an Algorand
network containing 500 thousands nodes, in which the amount
of stakes for leaders and committee members are SL = 26
and SM = 13K, respectively. In fact, SM is equal to
SSTEP ×(2+1)+SFINAL×1, according to Algorand, where
SSTEP = 1K, and SFINAL = 10K [25]. In other words,
SSTEP and SFINAL define bounds on the expected values of
Algo in a given round for reduction and BinaryBA?. In our
simulation, we distribute 50 millions Algos among these 500K
nodes using uniform distribution of U(1, 200) and normal
distribution of N (100, 20), N (100, 10). This is similar to the
initial phase of Algorand as well as the current status of the
Algorand network. We also simulated transactions between
all nodes. In each round, we choose randomly 1000 nodes, in
which nodes with higher stakes would be selected more often.
Note that a node can be chosen more than one time in each
round. Then we generate a series of random transactions for
selected nodes with a uniform distributions between −4 to 4.
Negative values represent sending Algos while positive values
represent receiving Algos in nodes. With these values we
tried to emulate the real Algorand exchange system available
at algoexplorer [40]. As for reward sharing mechanism, we
deploy Algorand Foundation proposal presented in Table 2
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(a) U(1, 200) (b) N (100, 20) (c) N (100, 10) (d) N (2000, 25)
Fig. 6: Distribution of computed Bi values in each simulation by our proposed mechanism, for different distributions of stakes.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7: (a) Distributed rewards in each round by our proposed algorithm and Algorand Foundation given different distribution
of stakes, (b) the accumulated rewards distributed among Algorand nodes, (c) the accumulated rewards when the algorand
nodes with less than 3 (U3(1, 200)), 5 (U5(1, 200)), and 7 (U7(1, 200)) stakes have been removed from the network.
and our proposed mechanism presented in Algorithm 1. We
run the simulation for each graph for 200 times with different
distributions, where each instance executes for 10 rounds. We
finally made an average of rewards in each round.
The results show that the calculated rewards by our pro-
posed mechanism follows the distribution of stakes in the net-
work, as shown in Figure 6. For example, we must distribute
high reward (around 50 Algos) for uniform distribution of
U(1, 200), as there exist many nodes with low stakes. But with
a normal distribution N (100, 10), we need only to distribute
small rewards, i.e., around 5 Algos. In fact N (100, 10) simu-
lates the initial phase of Algorand, where around 50 millions
Algos were in the network. Comparing the results presented in
Figure 6-(d) (which simulates current status of Algorand with
more than 1 billion Algos, by N (2000, 25) stake distribution)
with Figures 6-(c), we can also conclude that when the number
of Algo increases, we need smaller reward (around 1.2 Algos)
to enforce cooperation. The results show that the Foundation
can adapt the rewards given the status of the network in term
of stakes, by using our model.
Figure 7(a)-(b) show the exact calculated reward in each
round with our proposed algorithm and Algorand Foundation.
As it is discussed in Section III-B, Algorand Foundation
suggests simple increasing reward distribution, however our
approach adaptively choose the minimum possible reward to
guarantee cooperation. The results show that our proposed
mechanism distributes much smaller rewards among nodes,
given the distribution of stakes. For example, in contrast to
the proposed reward sharing by Algorand Foundation which
shares 20 Algos in each round for the first 500 thousands
rounds [37], our proposed reward sharing algorithm will share
about 5.2 Algos for normal distributions of stakes. More
interestingly, our proposal will not increase the reward till 6
millions blocks generation, as it can guarantee cooperation
without paying more Algos. Our approach only distributes
more rewards when the distribution of stakes is U(1, 200)
(Figures 6-(a) and 7(a)-(b)). This is due to the fact that the
number of nodes with small values of stakes are higher with
this distribution. If we remove the nodes with smaller stakes,
e.g., up to 7 stakes from the set of rewarded nodes we can still
keep the synchrony of network and distribute much smaller
reward. This is shown in Fig. 7-(c), (where we remove nodes
with stakes up to w, i.e., Uw(1, 200)). This also is useful for
the Foundation, to tune the reward sharing according to the
current conditions of stakes network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first introduced a system model to capture
the main operational features of Algorand blockchain. We
have then presented a game-theoretical model to analyze the
impact of defective behavior in Algorand blockchain. We then
defined different behaviors of nodes in Algorand and show
that there are no mutual cooperation states in the game where
an Algorand user cannot increase its payoff by unilaterally
defecting and not participating in the protocol tasks. We
then comprehensively studied the problem of selfishness and
proposed possible solution for it. We analyzed the defined
game and obtained the Nash equilibria for different conditions.
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Our analytical results shows that we can always enforce
cooperation by choosing enough rewards among Algorand
nodes. Moreover, our numerical analysis validated that the
proposed reward sharing mechanism outperforms the current
proposal by Algorand Foundation. We believe that this work
is the first step towards a better understanding of the effects of
selfish behavior in Algorand network. As the results show, our
mechanism can help the Algorand Foundation use the Algos
wisely as well as adapt dynamically with the distribution of
stakes in the network.
In term of future work, we can also get in touch with the
Algorand Foundation to introduce our proposed mechanism
for reward sharing in the initial phase (for 1.75 billion Algos),
as well as the distribution of transaction fees as reward in near
future.
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